Abstract: Markets, tort law, and direct regulation are alternative methods of achieving safety. Of these, the market is the most powerful, but it is often ignored in policy discussions. I show that both for the U.S. over time and for the world as a whole, higher incomes are associated with lower death rates, and I discuss some examples of markets creating safety. Markets may fail if there are third party effects or if there are information problems. Classic tort law is a reasonable (although expensive) way to handle third party effects for strangers, as in the case of auto accidents. In theory, regulation could solve information problems, but in practice many regulations overreach because of different information problems -consumers are unaware of unapproved alternatives. A particularly difficult information problem arises in the case of what I call -ambiguous‖ goods -goods that reduce some risks but increase others (as medical care and malpractice.) Product liability focuses on these goods; over half of the -litigation groups‖ of the American Association for Justice are for ambiguous goods. Increasing the price of these goods through tort liability may make consumers worse off because they are less likely to purchase more expensive goods. At least in the case of drugs both the regulatory system and the tort system are probably overly restrictive so using both is likely to lead to net consumer harm. This would argue for preemption -FDA approval should preempt state tort law.
In what follows I will discuss each element in turn. In discussing regulation and tort law, I will compare each to the market. I then discuss interactions between regulation and tort law.
Throughout the discussion, I stress the role of what I call -ambiguous‖ goods -goods that both increase and decrease safety. For example, pharmaceuticals reduce risk of disease but have side effects that are sometimes harmful. This class of goods turns out to be both important and difficult for any of the three safety systems to handle.
Markets
Markets will provide the amount of first party safety that consumers desire if the information environment is correct. That is, if consumers want safer products enough to be willing to pay for them, then businesses will find providing safety profitable and will provide the level of safety that consumers desire. This is the strongest force for safety. As shown in figures 1 and 2 and in Table 2 , as incomes increase accidental death rates, a measure of safety, are reduced. In Table 2 we see that coefficients on death rates as a function of per capita incomes are negative, meaning that higher incomes lead to lower death rates, and these coefficients are statistically significant. This happens both within the U.S. over time ( There is much additional evidence for the role of markets. There is a very substantial empirical literature estimating -value of life‖ based on wage premiums demanded by workers to accept additional risks. The basic notion in this literature is exactly that markets respond to worker preferences for safety. If markets did not respond, these studies would not be possible because the wage premiums would not exist. Kip Viscusi has done much of this research. One example is Viscusi and Aldy, 2003 . This paper estimates an income elasticity of value of life of about .5-.6. That is, for a one percent increase in income there is a .5 percent increase in value of life. Since markets respond to consumer valuation of safety, this implies a significant market response to income. Safety agencies routinely use data from these models in mandating safety improvements.
Product safety is also improved by voluntary standards organizations, such as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI). These are organizations largely funded privately be firms in the relevant businesses who find increasing the safety of their products profitable. For an example of market provided safety, consider -ground fault circuit interrupters‖ (GFCIs), the little boxes associated with electric plugs in most bathrooms and elsewhere that prevent electrocution. These were developed privately and widely adopted before they were mandated by law. Moreover, the process of adoption took many years, with the National Electric Code (a voluntary set of standards) mandating them for different purposes over a thirty year period, beginning in 197, as shown in Table 3 . 3 The National Electric Code is a voluntary standard, which however is commonly adopted as law by the states. During this time the technology continually improved due to private efforts. This is an example of a market increasing safety in subtle and nonobvious ways. Examination of voluntary codes for almost any product would find similar safety 3 See discussion on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residual-current_device.
improvements. Much of the work of the CPSC, for example, consists of working with voluntary standards organizations.
For another example, consider Electronic Stability Control Systems, the name for rollover protection technology for automobiles. These were first implemented by Mercedes and other manufacturers in 1996 and the number of vehicles with such complex systems has increased continually since then (Durisek and Granat, 2007 Because markets do lead to increased safety and because well functioning markets will provide the correct amount of safety (as measured by consumer preferences), in what follows I will compare regulation and tort law with the market solution. I will show that these alternatives can sometimes improve on the market solution, but that they can also make the situation worse.
There are two qualifications to the above statement regarding the efficiency of the market. First is the limit to -first party‖ safety and second is the state of the information environment. Moreover, some products are both safe and unsafe. That is some products can lead to reductions in some risks but increases in other risks. As we see below, these products create difficulties for the market and for both the regulatory and the tort system, mainly because of difficult information problems associated with this class of products.
There is another point to make about markets and safety. Markets provide the amount of safety that consumers desire, but they mostly do so quietly. Products become safer over time as minor improvements occur, but these may not be noticed by consumers, as discussed above for
GFCIs. Litigation and regulation are more obvious than pressure from markets, but as I show below, they are not necessarily better.
Indeed, markets are most noticeable when they fail -when there is some mishap. It is at this point that there is pressure to -Do something‖ -either stronger regulation or a lawsuit to punish the evildoers, or both. For example, the predecessor of the FDA was empowered to demand pre-market approval of drugs as a result of poisoning by Elixir Sulfanilamide in 1937.
In 1962 the FDA was allowed to demand proof of efficacy as well as safety in drugs as a result of the harms caused by the drug Thalidomide (even though the FDA already had enough power to prevent the sale of this drug in the U.S.) At CPSC we referred to -headline hazards,‖ meaning that regulatory efforts were commonly spurred by notorious accidents, even if the products involved were relatively harmless. Recently the CPSC Improvement Act, passed in response to lead found in some toys, has greatly expanded the power of the agency and has probably caused the shutdown of the used children's products industry (Trottman, 2008; Rubin, 2009) . (For a similar argument with respect to regulation in response to financial breakdowns, see Ribstein, 2003) .
First and Third Party Safety 4
In deciding on the level of safety associated with a product, a consumer will consider risks to herself (first party safety). However, some products may impose risks on third parties who are not part of the transaction. In these cases, consumers will purchase too little safety. In modern societies, the most important such product is the automobile. Automobiles can impose risks to the driver and to passengers -first party risks. Presumably purchasers of cars will consider this risk when deciding on the level of safety to acquire when buying a car. Features such as seat belts, collapsible steering columns, and air bags impact this form of safety.
However, automobiles can impose risks on third parties as well. These may be to other drivers (from collisions) or to pedestrians or bicyclists or motorcyclists. Drivers have some incentive to consider collision risks since they may be harmed as well, but these incentives are inadequate because car buyers will not fully consider risks to other cars and drivers. Drivers will have little reason to consider risks to pedestrians or to cyclists. Thus, in buying a car a consumer will purchase too little safety equipment. Fires may also cause harms to third parties -particularly in multi-family dwellings. Again, because a consumer bears part of the risk of fire consumers will make some effort to reduce this risk, but because the consumer bears only part of the risk, she will spend insufficient resources on avoiding this danger. It might be possible for tort law or regulation to efficiently improve safety when there are third party effects.
Information
Lack of information may also impede the functioning of markets. Most remaining risks in modern society are rather small because markets have already acted to reduce large risks. It may not pay for a consumer to learn about these risks because the cost of the time spent in such learning may outweigh the expected benefits of the additional safety. Nonetheless, there are many relatively low cost sources of information for widely distributed products, such as cars or drugs. (For an important discussion, see Polinsky and Shavell, 2010) . Media will inform consumers of risks. Competitors making less risky products also have incentives to advertise this. There are sources of information such as Consumers Reports and other magazines and media, including the nightly news. Consumers can discuss risks and mishaps with each other, and the Internet and all of its discussion mechanisms (for some examples, product rating sites, social groups, and blogs) has given this mechanism great power. The media often publicize these risks and firms suffer losses in stock value when products are identified either by tort suits or by regulatory agencies as causing harms (Rubin et al, 1988; Rubin and Prince, 2002) .
Moreover, there are market corrections for lack of safety information. A firm with a safer variant has an incentive to advertise this, and in so doing to inform consumers (directly or indirectly) about risks from other products. For one example, Volvo ads point out the risks of automobile accidents (by claiming that Volvo is less likely to suffer such accidents.) For another example, before they were stopped by misguided regulation, cigarette companies making low tar cigarettes emphasized the risks of smoking by claiming that they were safer (Calfee, 1997) .
Nonetheless, for low probability events or events where causation is delayed or uncertain, information may be difficult to obtain and understand, and markets may not work well. Again, there might be possibilities for improvement in this case.
Ambiguous Products
Some products and services reduce some risks but increase others; I call these -ambiguous‖ products (including both goods and services). The prime examples are pharmaceuticals and medical care. The primary function of these products is to reduce risks, but they may in turn create different risks. For medical care, these additional risks are called -malpractice.‖ For drugs they are called -side effects.‖ Proper regulation of the risks associated with these items requires a careful balance between harms created and harms averted. It is not clear that any of the three systems under consideration can correctly provide this balance.
Markets may not work because the risks are often subtle and hidden, and so information problems may arise. For example, sick people see physicians and take drugs. Even so, they may become sicker or perhaps die. If they suffer harms, they may not be able to tell if these harms are due to the underlying illness or to behavior of the physician or drug. Therefore, information about competence of a physician or safety of a drug may be difficult for an individual to determine. I discuss regulatory and tort problems below.
The Market: Summary
In sum, markets provide a good deal of safety. Much of this is not noticed by consumers as it is done quietly and as a routine part of normal business operations. But for risks where third parties are involved or for risks where information may be lacking, other forces -regulation or tort law -may be desirable. Where products and services both reduce and increase risks, more difficult issues arise.
Regulation 5
There are many agencies that regulate consumer safety -the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for automobile and traffic safety, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for safety of foods and drugs, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
for airline safety, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) for consumer product safety. 6 (Since all dangerous products have their own agency, it is sometimes said that the CPSC is responsible for safety regulation of all safe products.) Regulation mostly works ex ante:
regulators mandate safety before products are manufactured or sold, although agencies also generally have recall authority as well.
From the above analysis, some principles are immediately obvious. Where markets will work then there is no need for regulation. Markets work when risks are to first parties and potential victims are informed about risks or can easily learn about risks. If risks affect many 5 I confine my discussion to Federal agencies and I omit discussion of OSHA and other agencies that deal with workplace safety. 6 I was Chief Economist at the CPSC from [1985] [1986] [1987] users of a consumer product, then there will be forces leading to safety. I discuss first information, and then third party effects.
Information
If consumers are misinformed about risks and underestimate risks, then there is an argument for regulation. 7 This is because consumers may unknowingly purchase risky products.
A simple solution to information problems is to provide the missing information. In cases where risks are easily explained and remedies simple, information provision, for example, through labeling, would be a feasible alternative. This would apply to many aspects of auto safety regulation, such as seatbelts and airbags. It would also apply to pharmaceuticals. For example, the FDA could require manufacturers to prominently indicate that some drug -HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE FDA‖ and allow consumers to take their chances if they so desired. But agencies do not like this approach, and avoid it unless it is forced on them, as in the case of cigarettes and dietary supplements.
However, information provision will not always be the best solution. Information may be complex or difficult to absorb. Moreover, for some risks, a regulator may believe (correctly or incorrectly) that a consumer if properly informed would not ever buy the product, so that a ban is appropriate. This is presumably the justification for forbidding sale of unapproved pharmaceuticals and toys with small parts or high levels of lead. However, this creates a danger of overreaching. Regulators may not understand what risks consumers might be willing to take, or what tradeoffs consumers might find worthwhile. For example, it is my understanding that many consumers suffering from arthritis would have been willing to continue using Vioxx, even
given the apparent risk of heart attacks.
It is clear that regulators would like to ban the sale of cigarettes, but they do not have the power because voters who smoke would punish elected representatives if this were allowed.
Regulators have instead required extensive warnings and limits on sale. Similarly, when the FDA attempted to regulate dietary supplements, consumers protested to Congress which stopped the agency. On the other hand, when the CPSC mandated that baby cribs have slats no more than 2 3/8 inches apart to avoid infant strangulation, consumers were pleased that children were protected from this risk, which was probably unknown to them before the CPSC action.
Manufacturers were also pleased as this rule killed the used crib market.
Arguments based on lack of information may lead to overregulation. There is a risk of overregulation in many markets, most fully demonstrated in the case of the FDA regulation of drugs (first analyzed by Peltzman, 1973 ). This overregulation is especially likely in the class of ambiguous goods which both increase and reduce risk, as discussed above. This is because there is an asymmetry with respect to some risks. If a regulator allows an unsafe product (a Type 1 error), and consumers are injured, then Congress and the press will generally blame the regulator. If the regulator does not allow a safe product (a Type 2 error) and consumers are harmed by the lack of this product, the injured parties will often not know that they could have been saved by a product. The result is that the FDA is excessively cautious, and that consumers are harmed by this excessive caution. 8 This excess caution applies both to approval of a drug for sale and to promotion of that drug once it is approved. It is interesting that the FDA prides itself on being a science based organization and rejects anecdotal information about the benefits of drugs, but in discussing its drug regulation program it relies on anecdotes rather that discussing the scientific evidence about the effects of its regulation. For example, Meadows, 2006 , is an official history of the FDA. This paper mentions many examples of FDA regulation, but cites no evidence of the costs or net benefits of this regulation.
Note that this harm is caused by an informational asymmetry. I argued above that lack of information could in some circumstances be a justification for regulation. However, here we see that lack of information (albeit of a different sort) can also lead to excessive regulation. Thus, if consumers are unaware of side effects of drugs, then those in favor of regulation will argue that there is a market failure and regulation is justified. However, if this justification is used and regulation is imposed, the regulators themselves have an incentive to over regulate because of consumer ignorance about alternatives. If a drug is not approved, consumers will generally not be aware of the existence and possible benefits of this drug. This is even more likely if the costs of regulation mean that no company even bothers to develop some drug. If the FDA bans some advertisement which would have informed consumers about some benefit of a drug, then by definition consumers will not know of this ban. This means that it is not possible to unambiguously justify regulation based solely on a lack of consumer information. It is necessary to consider what sort of information consumers lack and to determine if regulation is likely to increase consumer welfare or reduce it. If consumers are unaware of unapproved alternatives for safety increasing products, then regulation may actually be harmful because it will create incentives for over regulation.
This suggests a policy approach for those who criticize the FDA. Rather than focusing on past failures, it might be useful to publicize current issues. Every year PhARMA (the pharmaceutical industry trade association) puts out a publication listing drugs in trial. However, this is a specialized publication and difficult to interpret. But an interested organization could take information about one or two promising drugs, perhaps for currently untreatable conditions, and publicize these drugs. -Currently, the FDA is delaying the release of a drug which has shown great promise in treating X cancer.‖ The drug companies could not put this information out because they are afraid of antagonizing the FDA, but a private party could. The example of AIDS has shown that if a group of patients becomes organized, they are able to force the FDA to act more quickly.
Third Party Effects
Although regulators seem to somewhat understand issues of information failure, there seems to be little understanding of third party effects. That is, many regulations affect purchasers of products where there is little information justification and no justification based on third party effects. Consider for example regulation of automobile safety. Certain features of an automobile effect only drivers or purchasers. These concern what is commonly are referred to as the -second collision‖ or -second impact‖ -the collision between the occupant of the automobile and the automobile itself following the -first collision‖ between the vehicle and another object.
Remedies for this second impact include lap and shoulder belts, padding, airbags, and collapsible steering columns. Note that none of these items have any influence on third parties. In fact, by making occupants safer they may actually increase risks to third parties because of -Peltzman effects‖. This is the tendency of drivers in safer vehicles to compensate by driving more carelessly (Peltzman, 1975) . Other elements of auto safety do affect third parties. These include brakes, lights, mirrors, dangerous hood ornaments, and bumper heights. In regulating auto safety NHTSA does not seem to distinguish between regulations that involve only first parties and those that involve third parties as well.
Other agencies ignore this distinction as well. For the FDA, some drugs -primarily antibiotics and vaccines --have third party effects. For antibiotics, the third party effects are ambiguous. Antibiotics may reduce the spread of infectious diseases. However, overuse may lead to antibiotic resistance which also harms third parties. Vaccines seem to provide unambiguously beneficial third party effects. For antibiotics, the agency actually seems to make approval more difficult in spite of these third party effects (Rubin, 2004-5 
Regulation: Summary
In sum, regulators seem to pay insufficient attention to market forces. While some regulation is justifiable because of lack of consumer information, much is not. Even when provision of information would be a reasonable remedy, the agencies will often directly regulate.
Moreover, lack of information about alternatives can lead to harmful regulation in the case of ambiguous goods. Regulators seem to ignore the distinction between first party and third party effects.
Tort Law 10
9 When I worked at the CPSC I never heard the issue of third party effects mentioned. To regulate only items with such effects would have led to a virtual shut down of the agency. 10 Some believe that tort law has a compensation function in addition to its deterrence function. However, because administrative costs of the tort system are so high (on the order of 50% or more) economists believe that other methods such as direct first party insurance or government insurance are more efficient and that the tort system should not be relied upon for compensation.
Classic tort law dealt with accidents between -strangers‖ -parties with no pre-accident relationship. This is a strict third party effect. Because the parties had no pre-accident relationship, they could not decide in advance what terms would govern in the event of an accident, nor could they bargain over optimal safety precautions. Therefore, the courts were forced to decide how to allocate costs and liability if there was a mishap. This model still governs the most common class of tort events -automobile accidents. Here the tort system (coupled with traffic laws and private insurance) works reasonably well, although there are those who suggest that -no-fault‖ accident insurance would be an improvement because it would save substantial amounts in legal fees (Keeton and O'Connell, 1965) .
The tort system contributes to safety through an ex post mechanism. Those causing injuries are required to pay the victims, and the threat of this payment causes potential injurers to take precautions to avoid accidents. Under certain circumstances it can be shown that this system will lead both victims and injurers to take optimal (efficient) precautions for accident avoidance (Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987) . (Note that optimal precautions are not maximal precautions. In other words, the optimal number of accidents is greater than zero.)
However, modern tort law has expanded well beyond this model. The most difficult areas of tort law are product liability and medical malpractice. Both of these differ significantly from classic tort law. In particular, in both cases parties are not strangers -they are in a preaccident relationship, as sellers and buyers or as doctors and patients. This has three implications. First, parties could in principle agree through contract or through a system of waivers on the level of precautions before any accident occurred. Then if the injurer did not adhere to this agreement, there could be a suit for breach of contract. Second, they could also agree in advance on the terms that would govern in the event of an accident. If so, they would likely agree on smaller damage payments than those provided by the tort system. (Rubin, 1993) .
Third, any payments by injurers will ultimately be reflected in the price of the good, and so will be paid for by customers. That is, the tort system will act as an insurance system: consumers pay premiums in the form of higher prices for goods and services, and receive compensation if they are injured. To the extent that tort law is mandatory (that is, to the extent that consumers cannot choose to opt out of tort law) then the insurance is mandatory. If tort law mandates insurance that is not worth the cost to consumers, then consumers may choose not to purchase products with the attached insurance even if the product would otherwise be desirable.
There are many problems with the product liability and malpractice systems as methods of accident prevention. A comprehensive critical analysis of product liability is in Polinsky and Shavell, 2010 . Their critique focuses on several issues. First, for widely sold products, there are market and regulatory forces that will lead to safety, so the product liability system is at best marginal in adding safety. Second, the system is extremely expensive -about fifty percent of the cost of the system is for expenses, including legal fees. These administrative costs are much greater is than either private insurance or than costs of the regulatory systems. (This is why the tort system is not an efficient system for compensation of victims.) Third, the system may not even work on its own terms. That is, it may not even increase safety. Lawyers of America) lists on its website -Litigation Groups,‖ groups of affiliated attorneys specializing in one type of lawsuit. There are currently 105 such groups (see Table 4 ). Of these, over half (55) specialize in litigation involving ambiguous goods (Table 5) . Lawyers focus on ambiguous goods for several reasons. First, people using these goods are already in some danger. Something unfortunate such as death is more likely to occur when someone is already sick or injured. Moreover, since the person was already is a bad situation, it is not always possible to determine if the good or service was responsible for the harm suffered (e.g., Would the patient have died anyway?) and some lawyers specialize in casting blame on physicians or drugs in this situation. Finally, injurers in these situations (doctors, pharmaceutical companies) are wealthy or have insurance (are -deep pockets‖) and so make inviting targets.
To the extent that litigation increases the price of such goods, then one effect is to reduce demand for the good and so perhaps increase risk. The result is that some consumers may not purchase these goods and so may forgo the safety benefits of the goods. Consumers may choose not to purchase goods because goods are bundled with insurance and some of the insurancenotably, that for -pain and suffering‖ (also called nonpecuniary damages) -is not worth the cost, and consumers never voluntarily buy such insurance. 11 Moreover, because of high administrative costs of the tort system, the value even of what would otherwise be desired insurance may not be worth the cost. In fact there is evidence that reducing the scope and power of tort law leads to increased safety. Rubin and Shepherd (2007) show that tort reforms in the states from 1981 to 2000 led to 24,000 fewer accidental deaths because of increased access to medical care. That is, cutting back the scope of tort law (for example, by capping damage payments) actually led to increased accidental deaths. That is, on the margin, tort law led to reduced, not increased, safety.
Tort Law: Summary
Classic tort law dealing with accidents between legal strangers (mainly auto accidents) is a reasonable way to reduce risks from driving. However, expansions of tort law into non-stranger areas (primarily malpractice and product liability) has severe problems. Tort law is the most expensive method of providing safety because of high transactions and administrative costs, including legal fees. Moreover, it is not clear that this branch of law does actually increase safety on the margin. Because tort law makes safety increasing products (e.g., drugs and medical care) more expensive, it may actually increase risks; there is empirical evidence consistent with this proposition.
Interaction Between Tort Law and Regulation
Many products are governed both ex ante and ex post, in the form of ex ante regulation and ex post liability for tort law. Whether this is a desirable set of policies is highly debated.
The issue is called -preemption‖ and the question is whether FDA or other federal government safety regulation -preempts‖ state tort law. The issue has been most carefully studied for drug regulation by the FDA.
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The situation is this: Because of fear of negative publicity if a harmful drug is approved, the FDA is overly cautious in approving drugs. That is, patients are harmed and even killed because some beneficial drugs are not approved or approved too late, or because FDA advertising regulations mean that some patients do not learn about beneficial drugs. Patients are also harmed by tort regulation, which increases the price of ambiguous goods (including drugs) and so prices some out of the market, even though on net the drug is beneficial (since FDA over caution means that many useful drugs will be delayed or not approved at all and any drug which is approved has a very high probability of being beneficial.)
This issue has been litigated in two recent Supreme Court cases. Riegel v. Medtronic (128 S. Ct. 999, 2008) was a case involving a medical device (a balloon catheter used in heart surgery) which was used in a way inconsistent with the label (directions) and which ruptured and caused an injury. The injured party sued in state court. Ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court held that FDA approval preempted state law. However, this finding was based on an explicit provision in the statute that preempted state court actions for approved medical devices:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-"(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and "(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter." §360k(a).
The U.S. Supreme Court relied on this Congressional language to find that state tort law was preempted.
Wyeth v. Levine (decided 2009) was a similar case involving a pharmaceutical rather than a device. A drug (Phenergan, an antihistamine used to treat nausea) was improperly administered to Diana Levine, leading to an injury and ultimately to amputation of her arm. She successfully sued the physician and health center where the drug was administered, and then sued the manufacturer (Wyeth) on the grounds that the labeling of the drug (which was approved by the FDA) was inadequate. In this case, the Supreme Court held that there was no preemption -that is, the Court held that the lawsuit under state law could proceed. The difference was that Congress had not specifically preempted state litigation when the FDA approves a drug (unlike the case of a device, where there was explicit preemption.)
While the Court decided these cases on legal grounds, the economics and the health effects are the same in both cases. Indeed, the case for preemption may be stronger for drugs in Wyeth than for devices in Riegel because the approval process for drugs is more stringent than the process for devices. The main point is that both the tort laws and the regulatory process are excessively restrictive, in that both lead to net harm for patients. Piling one overly restrictive process on top of another will simply lead to increasing harm.
Drugs will be more expensive because of the cost of the tort system. There will be fewer drugs because it will not pay manufacturers to invest in developing as many drugs. Those that are developed and approved will be used less frequently because they will be more expensive.
There is no reliable statistical evidence that either the FDA process or the tort system leads to greater safety and much evidence (cited elsewhere in this paper) that both lead to increased harm.
There is also evidence that newer drugs lead to reduced costs and improved health (Lichtenberg, 2003; Lichtenberg and Virabhak, 2007) . Thus, not allowing preemption will be a net harm for consumers. Congress could fix this by amending the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to allow the same preemption that is now granted to manufacturers of medical devices.
Summary
The three major forces for safety are markets, regulation and tort law. Markets are the most important source of safety, but the workings of the market in improving safety are not obvious to consumers. This creates pressure for tort law and regulation, which often follow some crisis or disaster.
Markets may not provide the optimal amount of safety because of third party effects and perhaps information deficiencies. In principle, these problems could be corrected by other The results of the time series and cross sectional regressions of accidental death rate dependent on per capita GDP are the following. In case of the time series data for the U.S., the coefficient on per capita GDP is -0.0009 with a t-statistic of -10.4621. The R 2 value for this regression is 0.7133. In case of the time series data for 112 countries, the coefficient on per capita GDP is -0.0005 with a t-statistic value of -2.6579. The R 2 value for this regression is 0.0603. Table 2 displays the simple regression results. All coefficients are statistically significant and conventional levels.
